InterJournal Complex Systems, 514
Status: Accepted
Manuscript Number: [514]
Submission Date: 20430
Revised On: 21030
How to Avoid Fooling Around in Minority Game?
Author(s): F. K. Chow

Subject(s): CX.13, CX.14, CX.16, CX.44

Category: Brief Article

Abstract:

Minority game (MG)[1][2] is a simple model of heterogeneous players who think inductively. It is one of the most important prototypes used in the study of the global collective behavior in free market economy under the notion of econophysics since it is a powerful tool to study the detailed pattern of fluctuations. In MG, there are three important parameters: the number of players $N$, the number of each player's strategies $S$ and the length of histories $M$. Maximal cooperation of players is observed in MG whenever $2^{M+1} approx NS$. However, is it possible to keep optimal cooperation amongst the players for any fixed values of $N$, $S$ and $M$? We report a simple and elegant way to alter the complexity of each strategy in MG with fixed $N$, $S$ and $M$ so that the system can always be locked in a global cooperative phase. Indeed, our investigation concludes that player cooperation is the result of a suitable sampling in the available strategy space. [1] D. Challet and Y.-C. Zhang, Physica A 246, 407 (1997). [2] Y.-C. Zhang, Europhys. News 29, 51 (1998).

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